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- Vol. 3 Issue 3
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Automatic Shuffling Process Using STM32F446RE
Authors
12345Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Vivekanandha College of Engineering for women, Tamilnadu, India.
Article Information
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- No DOI
- Published In
- Volume 3, Issue 3 (2022)
- Published Online
- May-June 2022
- Pages
- 655-662
- Article Type
- Research Article
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- No DOI available for cross-reference
References
[1] ABADI, M., BUDIU, M., ERLINGSSON, U., AND LIGATTI, J. Control-flow integrity. In Proc. of ACM CCS (2005).
ALEPHONE. Smashing the stack for fun and profit. ttps://users.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/630- f04/ readings/AlephOne97.txt, 1997.ARCH WIKI. Prelink. https://wiki.archlinux.org/ index.php/Prelink, 2015.
[2] BACKES, M., HOLZ, T., KOLLENDA, B., KOPPE, P., NÜRNBERGER, S., AND PEWNY, J. Youcan run
but you can’t read: Preventing disclosure exploits in executable code. In Proc. of ACM CCS (2014).
[3] BACKES, M., AND NÜRNBERGER, S. Oxymoron: Making finegrained memory randomization practical by allowing codesharing. In Proc.of USENIX Security (2014), pp. 433–447.
[4] BHATKAR, S., SEKAR, R., AND DUVARNEY, D. C. Efficient techniques for comprehensive protection from memory errorexploits. In Proc. of USENIX Security (2005), pp. 271–286.
[5] BIGELOW, D., HOBSON, T., RUDD, R., STREILEIN, W., AND OKHRAVI, H. Timely rerandomization for
mitigating memory disclosures. In Proc. of ACM CCS (2015), pp. 268–279.
[6] BITTAU, A., BELAY, A., MASHTIZADEH, A., MAZIERES, D., AND BONEH, D. Hacking blind. In Proc. of IEEE S&P(2014), pp. 227–
242.
[7] BLETSCH, T., JIANG, X., FREEH, V. W., AND LIANG, Z. Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack.In Proc. of ACM CCS (2011), pp. 30–40.
[8] BRADEN, K., CRANE, S., DAVI, L., FRANZ, M., LARSEN, P., LIEBCHEN, C., AND SADEGHI, A.-R. Leakage-resilient layout
randomization for mobile devices. In Proc. of NDSS (2016).
[9] CARLINI, N., BARRESI, A., PAYER, M., WAGNER, D., AND GROSS, T. R. Control-flow bending: On the effectivenessof control-flow
integrity. In Proc. of USENIX Security (2015), pp. 161–176.
[10] CHEN, S., XU, J., SEZER, E. C., GAURIAR, P., AND IYER, R. K. Non-control-data attacks are realistic threats. In Proc. ofUSENIX Security
(2005).
[11] CHEN, Y., WANG, Z., WHALLEY, D., AND LU, L. Remix: Ondemand live randomization. In Proc. of ACM CODASPY(2016), pp. 50–61.
[12] CONTI, M., CRANE, S., DAVI, L., FRANZ, M., LARSEN, P., NEGRO, M., LIEBCHEN, C., QUNAIBIT, M., AND SADEGHI, A.-R. Losing
control: On the effectiveness of control-flow integrity under stack attacks. In Proc. of ACM CCS(2015), pp. 952–963.
[13] CORBET, J. x86 NX support. http://lwn.net/Articles/ 87814/, 2004.
[14] CORBET, J. Memory protection keys [lwn.net]. https:// lwn.net/Articles/643797/, 2015.
[15] CRANE, S., LIEBCHEN, C., HOMESCU, A., DAVI, L., LARSEN, P., SADEGHI, A.-R., BRUNTHALER, S., AND FRANZ, M. Readactor:
Practical code randomization resilient to memory disclosure. In Proc. of IEEE S&P (2015), pp. 763–780.
[16] CRANE, S. J., VOLCKAERT, S., SCHUSTER, F., LIEBCHEN, C., LARSEN, P., DAVI, L., SADEGHI, A.-R., HOLZ, T., DE SUTTER, B.,
AND FRANZ, M. It’s a TRaP: Table randomization and protection against function-reuse attacks. In Proc. of ACM CCS (2015), pp. 243–255.
[17] CURTSINGER, C., AND BERGER, E. D. Stabilizer: Statistically sound performance evaluation. In Proc. of ACM SIGARCH (Mar. 2013),
pp. 219–228.
[18] CVEDETAILS. Vulnerability distribution of CVE security vulnerabilities by types. https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerabilities-by-types.php,2016.
ALEPHONE. Smashing the stack for fun and profit. ttps://users.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/630- f04/ readings/AlephOne97.txt, 1997.ARCH WIKI. Prelink. https://wiki.archlinux.org/ index.php/Prelink, 2015.
[2] BACKES, M., HOLZ, T., KOLLENDA, B., KOPPE, P., NÜRNBERGER, S., AND PEWNY, J. Youcan run
but you can’t read: Preventing disclosure exploits in executable code. In Proc. of ACM CCS (2014).
[3] BACKES, M., AND NÜRNBERGER, S. Oxymoron: Making finegrained memory randomization practical by allowing codesharing. In Proc.of USENIX Security (2014), pp. 433–447.
[4] BHATKAR, S., SEKAR, R., AND DUVARNEY, D. C. Efficient techniques for comprehensive protection from memory errorexploits. In Proc. of USENIX Security (2005), pp. 271–286.
[5] BIGELOW, D., HOBSON, T., RUDD, R., STREILEIN, W., AND OKHRAVI, H. Timely rerandomization for
mitigating memory disclosures. In Proc. of ACM CCS (2015), pp. 268–279.
[6] BITTAU, A., BELAY, A., MASHTIZADEH, A., MAZIERES, D., AND BONEH, D. Hacking blind. In Proc. of IEEE S&P(2014), pp. 227–
242.
[7] BLETSCH, T., JIANG, X., FREEH, V. W., AND LIANG, Z. Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack.In Proc. of ACM CCS (2011), pp. 30–40.
[8] BRADEN, K., CRANE, S., DAVI, L., FRANZ, M., LARSEN, P., LIEBCHEN, C., AND SADEGHI, A.-R. Leakage-resilient layout
randomization for mobile devices. In Proc. of NDSS (2016).
[9] CARLINI, N., BARRESI, A., PAYER, M., WAGNER, D., AND GROSS, T. R. Control-flow bending: On the effectivenessof control-flow
integrity. In Proc. of USENIX Security (2015), pp. 161–176.
[10] CHEN, S., XU, J., SEZER, E. C., GAURIAR, P., AND IYER, R. K. Non-control-data attacks are realistic threats. In Proc. ofUSENIX Security
(2005).
[11] CHEN, Y., WANG, Z., WHALLEY, D., AND LU, L. Remix: Ondemand live randomization. In Proc. of ACM CODASPY(2016), pp. 50–61.
[12] CONTI, M., CRANE, S., DAVI, L., FRANZ, M., LARSEN, P., NEGRO, M., LIEBCHEN, C., QUNAIBIT, M., AND SADEGHI, A.-R. Losing
control: On the effectiveness of control-flow integrity under stack attacks. In Proc. of ACM CCS(2015), pp. 952–963.
[13] CORBET, J. x86 NX support. http://lwn.net/Articles/ 87814/, 2004.
[14] CORBET, J. Memory protection keys [lwn.net]. https:// lwn.net/Articles/643797/, 2015.
[15] CRANE, S., LIEBCHEN, C., HOMESCU, A., DAVI, L., LARSEN, P., SADEGHI, A.-R., BRUNTHALER, S., AND FRANZ, M. Readactor:
Practical code randomization resilient to memory disclosure. In Proc. of IEEE S&P (2015), pp. 763–780.
[16] CRANE, S. J., VOLCKAERT, S., SCHUSTER, F., LIEBCHEN, C., LARSEN, P., DAVI, L., SADEGHI, A.-R., HOLZ, T., DE SUTTER, B.,
AND FRANZ, M. It’s a TRaP: Table randomization and protection against function-reuse attacks. In Proc. of ACM CCS (2015), pp. 243–255.
[17] CURTSINGER, C., AND BERGER, E. D. Stabilizer: Statistically sound performance evaluation. In Proc. of ACM SIGARCH (Mar. 2013),
pp. 219–228.
[18] CVEDETAILS. Vulnerability distribution of CVE security vulnerabilities by types. https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerabilities-by-types.php,2016.
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